

Beyond Elections?

Deliberation and Democracy in the European Union

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Abstract

Critics of the state of democracy in the European Union (EU) have suggested that the introduction of deliberative institutions could improve the connection between elite and mass opinion in the EU. This article empirically examines the functioning of two large-scale EU-wide deliberative events held in 2006-2007. We ask four questions about such events: Who participates? What is the quality of the deliberation that takes places within them? How does participation change the way participants think about issues of collective governance in the Europe? And what sort of information can be distilled from such an event to inform existing channels of policy-making in Europe? We find that such events over-represent the well-educated, students, men, and retirees, relative to the overall population. Participants judge the events to provide opportunities for high-quality deliberation. Interestingly, outsiders (the unemployed and low-skilled) are even more likely than other demographic groups to be satisfied with the quality of the deliberation. Across both events, whether constructed on the basis of national or trans-national deliberation, we find that those who are pro-European are more likely to participate, and that these people become even more pro-European in their sentiment over the course of deliberations. We find the structure of these deliberations unsuited to informing existing European policy-making, both because they do not try to answer concrete policy questions and because they do not force participants to make trade-offs among different policy areas. Further research is needed to consider whether such deliberative events can be used to provide a citizen perspective on policy questions facing the EU.

Keywords: deliberation; participation; democracy; European Union

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Introduction

How do European citizens participate in the politics of the European Union? There are currently three electoral avenues of popular participation, and a good deal of research in political science contends that each is flawed. The most obvious way for a citizen to take part is by voting in elections to the European Parliament. Yet fewer than 43 percent of the public saw fit to exercise this privilege in the most recent election in June 2010. Participation in these elections has declined continuously since 1979. This is hardly surprising, given that many national parties ignore these votes, and that voters treat them as little more than second-order national elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Hix and Marsh 2007).

Europeans also participate in the political life of the Union is by voting in national elections, since these elections determine the composition of the national governments who comprise the European Council. Yet most party systems have failed to incorporate competition over Europe as a major axis of division between mainstream national parties (Mair 2000, 2005). In almost every member-state, parties of the center-left and center-right are virtually indistinguishable in their pro-Europe positions (Marks et al 2006). Thus there is a division within European public opinion that most national party systems fail to express (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 2007). National voters may take part in the European Union as a legal matter, but the only outlet for Euro-skeptic views are parties on the extremes of the system (Crum 2007).

The third mode of direct participation is the national referendum. Referenda are blunt tools which ask voters to answer complex questions either “yes” or “no.” The French, Dutch, and Irish “no” votes on constitutional reform in the Union were good theater, but they neither catalyzed nor reflected enlightened deliberation. Notably, they failed to deliver any clear message of what citizens thought about the European project, given the multiple and conflicting motivations of “no” voters (Aarts and van der Kolk 2006, Brouard and Tiberj

2006). Papadopoulos (2005) has argued that the use of citizen referenda could contribute to greater accountability of elites to citizen perspectives and thereby a greater democratic legitimacy of EU policy-making. This accountability function depends on the prospect of referenda being initiated from below, by popular demand (as in Switzerland), rather than from above, by elites. But to date, EU referenda have served mainly to highlight the gulf between mass and elite opinion rather than to tether elites to any harness of popular accountability (Hooghe and Marks 2007).

There is a fourth potential mode of direct citizen participation, the use of citizen deliberative forums at the EU level, about which empirical work in political science has had much less to say. Scholars have proposed that deliberative councils can improve both the quality of EU decision-making and the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Boussaguet and Dehousse 2008), and legal scholars have shown how deliberation among elites is fundamental to the new ways of policy-making in Europe (Joerges and Neyer 1997). But the paucity of deliberative institutions in the European Union has offered few examples of how the use of popular citizen deliberation might work in practice, until now.¹

In this article we make a preliminary empirical contribution to this issue by examining the experience of two large-scale citizen deliberations sponsored by the European Commission as part of its Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate in 2006-2007. Our questions are basic, which we think is appropriate to the uncertain state of knowledge on deliberation in Europe. First, who participates in such events? Second, what is the quality of the deliberation that takes place within them? Third, how does participation change the way they think about issues of collective governance in Europe? And finally, what sort of

¹ The *European Journal of Political Research* dedicated a recent issue to deliberative and participatory policy-making in Europe (vol 46, no. 4, 2007). But the empirical cases studied in this issue were all of a national character, rather than directly oriented toward citizen participation in the EU (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007).

information can be distilled from such an event to inform established channels of policy-making in Europe?²

Our answers to the first two questions are related in an interesting way. The deliberative forums we studied disproportionately attract the well-educated, and they disproportionately attract those who think the EU has been a good thing for their countries. These tend to be the same people, as those with high human capital have benefited most from increasing mobility across borders. We also observe a pronounced, positive shift in pro-European sentiment among participants in these councils. Participants become more pro-European, even though these are people who were already more pro-European than average. We suspect that such a finding will not displease those European policy-makers who advocate using deliberative councils to bolster the sagging democratic legitimacy of the EU. However, while we are certain that this pro-Europe effect is real, and we tend to think it generalizable, we doubt it is a product of enlightenment. In other words, we are not persuaded that people who know the EU come to love it. Instead, we think the pro-Europe shift is likely to be an artifact of selection protocols that disproportionately attract pro-Europeans, whom we call Europhiles.

As far as we have been able to ascertain, these deliberative projects have had no immediate impact upon public policy. We would indeed have been very surprised to find anything else from experiments that were so new. But the question of policy impact is, in the long run, where the rubber hits the road for deliberative councils like those described below. The question about such events is whether the information they produce can become a reliable source of citizen input into the policy process of the European Union. We remain agnostic about this question. But if such information is to be used in the future, the experiences of these two deliberative events suggest that citizen councils will have to engage

² These are similar to the criteria laid out in Papadopoulos and Warin (2007) for the study of national participatory and deliberative policy-making.

concrete problems rather than broad agendas. We speculate about what this engagement might look like in later sections of the article.

Mini-Publics: Two Institutional Designs for Deliberation

The 2005 referenda defeats for the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands highlighted the gap between elite and mass support for the European Union. In the wake of these defeats, the European Commission called for a period of reflection. Margot Wallström, the Communications Commissioner, used this occasion to launch Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate in October 2005. The stated goal of Plan D was to stimulate national debates that engaged citizens in a discussion about the EU. Plan D provided funding to six major projects. Two of them attempted to mount direct participatory events on a scale that involved some citizens from all member-states in deliberations over their expectations from the European Union. These two events were the Tomorrow's Europe deliberative poll (TE) and the European Citizens' Consultations (ECCs).

TE and the ECCs are part of a broader class of events that allow for direct citizen participation in the formulation and implementation of policy (Dryzek 2000). Such events, which we call mini-publics, do not derive their legitimacy from the fact that every citizen can participate, as do electoral mechanisms (Fung 2003). Their presumed legitimacy instead comes only if the large public sphere of Europeans regards such mini-publics as an effective deliberative proxy. In other words, their legitimacy depends on their being regarded as competent and honest brokers between citizens and EU officials. Though the vast majority of European citizens will never directly participate in any mini-public, these forums could nevertheless form a bridge of legitimacy because those non-participating citizens would believe that people more or less like them were able to consider critical policy questions,

issue guidance, and elicit reasonable responses from EU officials. Direct deliberation of everyone in a transnational regime of hundreds of millions of Europeans is impossible, but the use of mini-publics is one way in which deliberation by proxy might work.

We were able to gather original pre- and post-event survey data from three of the largest national deliberations in the ECC project. Most of this paper reports these results. We did not have comparable survey data from the Tomorrow's Europe project, though one of us attended a planning meeting with the event's main sponsors prior to its launch and another of us attended the actual TE deliberative poll. The organizers of Tomorrow's Europe have not yet made data from the project publicly available, but we are able to draw on some initial findings presented on the project's website as well as a conference paper written by the organizers of Tomorrow's Europe (Luskin et al 2008). The Tomorrow's Europe deliberation was structured very differently from the ECC, and this comparison is useful for understanding trade-offs involved in different choices about deliberative institutions at the EU level. We take advantage of this comparison where possible, even though most of our original data only relate to the ECC project.

European Citizens' Consultations

The heart of the European Citizens' Consultations involved one national participative event in each of the 27 member-states of the European Union. Each event involved between 28 and 200 citizens of that country, although in only 8 countries did the events have more than 50 participants. In total, 1,477 people took part in the 27 national deliberations which took place over four weekends in February and March, 2007. Each country-level ECC discussed the same three agenda items, which had been determined at an initial agenda-setting event held in Brussels in October 2006.

The agenda-setting event in Brussels was attended by 200 people from across the EU.³ For each member-state there were eight randomly selected participants. Thus all states were represented by equal numbers of deliberators, regardless of their overall population. Prior to the event, all participants received a survey with two open-ended items asking what they liked and what they disliked about Europe. Based on responses to these two items, event organizers developed a list of 23 topics for discussion. Then, over the course of one weekend in Brussels, participants were organized in small group table discussions and plenary sessions where organizers tasked them with prioritizing and winnowing the list of 23 topics into a smaller list of the most important priorities to be discussed in the national deliberative sessions. Participants eventually settled on three priority topics: environment and energy, social welfare and family, and global role and immigration.

Each national ECC event took these three topics as part of the agenda for discussion, with instructions to devote equal time to each topic. Participants at all locations followed a common deliberative procedure and agenda which is described in each country's summary report:

The result of the national consultations is a combination of carefully facilitated table discussions among citizens, the exchange of results across locations and the prioritisation of their ideas through voting mechanisms. At each event, groups or tables of citizens were overseen by a table facilitator who kept the discussion going and made sure that every voice was heard. Results were shared at pre-defined points in time by exchanging information through an online forum and live conferences. Prior the event, citizens received background information on the project and the 3 topics. No prior knowledge

³ As Bulgaria and Romania did not officially join the Union until January 1, 2007, there were at the time representatives from the 25 then-member-states of the EU. The final report on the agenda-setting event, available on the ECC website (<http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu/8.0.html>), observes that the 200 participants were randomly selected based on a number of demographic characteristics of the European population as a whole, although they were all selected from the same region within each member-state. Our observation, as well as those of ECC organizers with whom we spoke after the event, was that the group of people assembled for the agenda-setting was far from a random or demographically representative group of Europeans.

was required. Citizens were chosen in random selection and based on demographic criteria that ensured diversity.⁴

Although the broad procedure to be followed was standardized, our discussions with ECC organizers lead us to believe that there was wide variation in the practice of how these instructions were implemented across the twenty-seven separate national events. An important feature of this variation at the outset was that ECC organizers sub-contracted the sampling and recruitment of participants to firms in each member country. Thus while each firm was given a common objective of obtaining a descriptively representative pool of participants, the methods used to reach that objective very likely differed across these firms. Moreover, as is clear from the table below, the proportion of participants for each national ECC does not correspond to the population of that member country vis-à-vis the EU population, either proportionally or in rank-order. For example, Belgium (pop: 10.5 million) had an ECC with 120 participants, while Italy (pop: 59.8 million) had an ECC with 40 participants.

Each national event was organized by a local partner. Those local partners varied substantially in their knowledge and experience in carrying out deliberative events. Even though the national events followed a standard protocol, there were variations in the extent to which the participants constituted an unbiased representative sample of national populations; in the information participants received before the deliberations; and in the experience and competence of the moderators of plenary and table-based deliberative sessions. We return to these issues below in our discussion of the three events for which we have data on participants' attitudes from pre- and post-event surveys. The table below lists the national events and their number of participants.

⁴ This boilerplate appears in each country's ECC summary report.

[Table 1 here]

Each national ECC aimed to produce a report that specified, for three topic areas, a vision statement and a statement of the role of the EU. Thus, for each of the three topic areas, the weekend of table-based deliberation aimed to generate a statement beginning “We want to live in a Europe that...” and one beginning “The EU should....” Some final reports also specified the role that national governments should play to fulfill such a vision. As each national event was taking place simultaneously with between four and nine other national ECCs during the same weekend, the agenda also included discussion of the points being raised at other parallel events. These national reports formed the basis for a synthesis report, which was assembled at a session in Brussels in May, 2007, and submitted to European Union policy-makers by citizen representatives from each country.

Tomorrow's Europe

Tomorrow's Europe, organized primarily by the think-tank Notre Europe, was the first attempt to stage a deliberative poll across the European Union. Deliberative polling, a technique developed by James Fishkin, attempts to assemble a group of deliberators randomly selected and representative of the polity at large across all major demographic categories. Prior to meeting, participants are provided with briefing materials that provide information on expert opinion on different sides of the issue to be discussed. Participants are surveyed at three points in time: (1) before receiving their briefing materials; (2) at the beginning of the deliberative poll; and (3) at the conclusion of the deliberative poll. Participants discuss the issues at hand in table-based discussions and query experts in plenary

sessions. Participants do not attempt to reach consensus or any kind of agreement with one another in this process. Rather, the goal is to discover to whether and to what extent views on a given issue change as a result of deliberation among a representative sample of a population on that issue.

TE was unique among deliberative polls previously run by Fishkin in that it attempted to generate a representative transnational deliberation over the course of a weekend in Brussels. In Fishkin's words, the goal for TE was thus to create "a scientific microcosm" of the European public sphere. This posed a number of challenges. Foremost among these was the challenge of obtaining a representative sample of European participants through a stringent selection procedure. Representative sampling from a population is fundamental to the methodology of the deliberative poll, because it aspires to provide a social scientific answer to the question, "What would the people think in politics if they really were well-informed and had thought about the issues?"

In an unpublished conference paper, the TE organizers describe a two-stage method of obtaining a representative sample of participants and a comparison sample of non-participants. First, random sampling was conducted in parallel in all 27 member states by a single firm, TNS Sofres, yielding a pool of 3,550 interviewees. From this pool, a subset was "randomly invited" to participate in the deliberative poll (Luskin et al, 2008, p. 2). Three hundred and sixty two of those invited came to the European Parliament building in Brussels on October 12-14, 2007. A purely random sample of 362 participants out of the roughly half-billion persons in the EU is unlikely, in one sense, be representative of European opinion, because such a sample would likely exclude any Maltese, Luxembourgish, Estonians, or Cypriots, for example.⁵ Thus while the TE organizers were explicit about how randomly

⁵ A strictly representative sample of 362 people from the EU-27 would include about one-third of one Maltese person.

sampled their participants were, they also aimed to “wind up with a sample in which each country’s representation would be roughly proportional to the size of its delegation in the European Parliament.” This is a targeted sampling objective that is non-random and, in fact, what the TE achieved. As Table 2 below shows, all 27 member-states sent representatives and the discrepancies from 2007 EU population statistics are noticeable and sometime quite large.

The remaining 3,188 individuals (out of the original 3,550 respondents) made up a comparison group of “non-participants.” While there is no public documentation on the specific sample design used in this deliberative experiment, it seems clear that even the “whole sample” of 3,550 respondents is not a pure random sample, but more of a stratified sample with a quota for a minimum number of 80 total respondents (participants and non-participants) for each member-state. One consequence of setting such quotas – which are, of course, sensible from the standpoint of being able to compare “average opinion” in one member-state to that in another with some semblance of statistical power – is that there are sharp discrepancies between the representation of member-states in the TE poll and the representation of member-states’ populations in the EU. Malta, with a population of slightly more than 403,000, has the same representation in the TE poll as Sweden, which has a population of more than 9 million.

Another consequence of TE’s approach is that the pools of “participants” and “non-participants” are recruited through different sampling methods. Thus, while TE reports and briefs often combine both groups into a “whole sample” for each member country, the relative input of participants as a proportion of this “whole sample” differs markedly across the 27 member countries. For smaller states like Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and Slovenia, participants in the deliberative poll make-up between 2.5 to 4.6% of the whole

samples from their respective countries. For other states, this proportion is much higher (as high as 14% for Austria and the Netherlands). As we discuss in further detail below, the non-comparability of the two sampling designs is potentially significant for what we infer about the representativeness and legitimacy of TE.

[Table 2 here]

Despite the fact that TE organizers expended significant effort and expense to ensure a broadly representative European public space, the pool of participants was not fully representative in several key aspects. Those who were gainfully employed and most highly educated were much more likely to participate than their role in the population would suggest. Men and students participated more than one would expect from their size in the population; retirees and the unemployed participated proportionately less than one would expect (Luskin et al. 2008). In TE, only 1.7 percent of participants in the deliberative poll were not employed and seeking work; in the Eurobarometer-25, that figure is 5.8 percent. In TE, 15.5 percent of participants were retirees; in the Eurobarometer-25, that figure is 23.8 percent. In addition to these measurable distortions, there are also potentially important regional or cultural differences within member-countries that were not adequately reflected in the sampling procedure.

From the standpoint of representativeness as an intrinsic goal – perhaps as a source of legitimacy gained through a “politics of presence” – non-representativeness in itself is a shortcoming of TE or any other approach to deliberative mini-publics. From the standpoint of representativeness as an instrumental goal – perhaps as a source of legitimacy as a

deliberative proxy – non-representativeness is a potential shortcoming under conditions. First, non-representativeness matters to the extent that, between participants and non-participants, one group is more likely to change their views in response to deliberation than the other. Second, non-representativeness matters the extent that the views of one group differ from those of the other. On the first of these possibilities, comparing the plasticity of the views of participants and non-participants under deliberative contexts cannot be assessed. This is so because the susceptibility of non-participants to opinion change is unobservable.

On the second condition under which representativeness as an instrumental goal may be thwarted by sampling distortions – where participants and non-participants differ in their initial starting points – TE organizers report that any differences in policy attitudes between participants and non-participants, while statistically significant, were “modest” (Luskin *et al*, 2008, p.3). This is somewhat reassuring, but because the participant and non-participant samples are drawn differently, it remains unknown whether these seemingly negligible differences are a purely serendipitous result, a result of sampling differences that camouflage underlying differences between participants and non-participants, or a reflection of the constancy of opinion across various educational and employment markers.⁶

In contrast to the ECC, the agenda for deliberation was not generated out of a deliberative process. TE organizers instead chose two broad topics for the deliberation: 1) jobs and pensions and 2) the role of Europe in the world. The first topic included discussions of potential reforms of labor markets, pensions, and welfare states. The second topic included discussions of the role of EU in certain policy areas, including the possibility of an expanded role in energy supply management and climate change; this topic also included discussions about EU enlargement. The choice of these topics seems to have been somewhat influenced

⁶ This concern is parallel to the issue of whether “public opinion” as constructed through opinion polls is representative across different response rates of population sub-groups in surveys (see, e.g., Brehm 1993).

by the interests of large sponsors of the event: Allianz Insurance (interested in pensions) and the Open Society Institute (interested in enlargement and Europe's role in the world).

The deliberative poll was held in the European Parliament building in Brussels, using its simultaneous translation facilities, in October 2007. Among the most noteworthy opinion shifts among participants was an increase in the willingness to make sacrifices to save pension regimes, though those in favor of raising the retirement age remained a minority. Support for further enlargement decreased in post-event surveys of the deliberative poll. This effect was especially strong for support for admitting Ukraine, but also substantial for admitting Turkey.

Differences in Structure

The ECCs and Tomorrow's Europe had different goals and structures. We highlight a few of those differences here to underline the many design choices involved in staging deliberative events at the European level. The principal differences we explore are the national vs. transnational character of the deliberative event itself; the variation in the degree of control exercised by central organizers; and the different sorts of outputs generated by the two different models.

Like the EU itself, the ECCs involved a complex interaction between transnational events (the agenda-setting and concluding sessions) and national discussions (the 27 individual ECCs). The national ECCs were held on weekends when other ECCs were simultaneously taking place, but the exchange among the national groups was minimal. It is possible that such an international structure makes deliberation with individual events easier, given the common political discourses within each national public than in a transnational

deliberation where “security” may connote different thing to an Estonian and a French person. But we do not have the data to answer this question.

If it is easier to sustain the conditions for political deliberation with a national public, such national deliberations also face certain disadvantages vis-à-vis the transnational structure of Tomorrow’s Europe. One such disadvantage is the difficulty in summarizing what “the people of Europe” have said in such a deliberative event. TE organizers secured representation from all 27 member-states, and are able to generalize about how this transnational group of Europeans changed in the wake of deliberation. There is no such easy way for EU policymakers to read the results of what the “European citizens” have said through the ECCs. The summary document produced from the ECCs is almost unreadable, given that each point is not supported by every country.⁷

Second, the differently structured events give central organizers different levels of control over the execution of the deliberative event. Each event involved several sponsoring partners, but there was a lead organization for each that was clearly in charge: the King Baudouin Foundation (KBF) for the ECCs, and Notre Europe for Tomorrow’s Europe. While the KBF asked the local operational partners to ensure random selection and a nationally representative sample, the fact that selection had been decentralized created the possibility for multiple points of divergence in the implementation of common selection and agenda protocols. Tomorrow’s Europe, by contrast, was organized by a small group working closely

⁷ Here, for example, is the opening paragraph of the synthesis document from the ECCs (the two-letter abbreviations refer to member-states whose deliberations supported a given issue): “All across Europe, our national consultations nearly unanimously ask for the EU to play a substantial role in virtually all social policy issues, and actively create a “social Europe” (25 MS) beyond the ‘economic Europe’. We would like Europe to play a larger role in promoting equal rights (12 MS) and safeguarding the dignity and individuality (PT/IE/AT), and human rights (UK) of all persons, and in protecting vulnerable and disadvantaged (CY/IE/PT/LV/SK/HU/GR/BE/UK) members of our societies from discrimination (FR/NL) and in eliminating poverty (FI/AT/UK). One of our panels urges for the integration of social rights into a Constitutional Treaty (HU). Another wants Europe to play a pioneering role in the world regarding social issues (BE).”

The text of the entire synthesis document is available at http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/ECC_Fin_Con_Media/ECC_Fin_Con_Perspectives_FINAL_1_.pdf.

with James Fishkin. A single agency, TNS Sofres, administered the TE selection procedures. We would therefore expect fewer deviations from the central plan than in the more decentralized structure of the ECCs.

Finally, the sorts of messages that a policy-maker can take from an event are quite different. The individual ECCs were structured so as to create a working document that stated both the general European aspirations of participants in a policy area and the concrete dimensions of EU and member-state competencies that would be desirable to reach such general aspirations. At a general level, the ECCs produced national mission statements. However, given their level of generality, the ECCs did not force participants to make any hard choices involving costs and benefits.

The deliberative poll model of Tomorrow's Europe does not ask participants to support a consensus document. It simply allows participants to discuss issues and presents them with information, and then tests through post-event surveys to what extent their opinions changed from their pre-event opinions. The value of the deliberative poll in many cases lies in getting an informed citizen perspective about a concrete policy problem, especially where political forces are closely balanced. The far more general and complex character of the issues debated at Tomorrow's Europe—and the consequently more superficial level of engagement with any particular policy problem—mean that European political leaders may not be persuaded that these views represent the considered wisdom of the European populace.

Results from the European Citizens' Consultations

The Sample

With the cooperation of the organizers of the ECCs, we fielded pre- and post-event surveys at three sites on the final weekend of the deliberations: Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.⁸ These were the three largest deliberations held on the final weekend. One of the criteria guiding cases for research was to ensure variation in the average degree of Euroskepticism (or inversely, Europhilia) in the countries studied. The standard Eurobarometer question on this issue is “Generally speaking, (our country’s) membership of the European Union is....” The possible answers are “a good thing,” “neither good nor bad,” or “a bad thing.” The percent answering “a good thing” is a rough inverse indicator of the extent of Euroskepticism within a given country. Eurobarometer results from spring 2008 show that our three cases span the gamut of national levels of Euroskepticism. In Spain, 65 percent answered that membership in the EU was a good thing, which is 13 points above the EU-27 average (52 percent); Sweden stood just above the mean, at 54 percent; and Britain had the second-lowest score among member-states, at 30 percent.

In table 3, we list the overall characteristics of the sample, and how it compares to the average population of the EU-27 countries. As Table 3 demonstrates, participants in the ECCs, like participants of Tomorrow’s Europe, were not perfectly representative of the broader European population. As in TE, participants were more likely to be male, more likely to be students, less likely to be retired, and far better educated than the EU average population. Our educational questions, which are modeled on those used by Eurobarometer,

⁸ All three deliberations took place the weekend of March 24-25, 2007, which was the fourth and final weekend of the ECC national deliberations. We wrote the pre- and post-event surveys in English. Elena Fagotto translated them into Spanish, and Magnus Lundgren (whose help we gratefully acknowledge) translated them into Swedish. We asked the organizers to distribute the surveys to participants and to remind them at the beginning and at the end of the event to return them. The response rate was very high: 80 respondents (out of 81 participants) in the UK; 91 (of 92) in Spain; and 90 (of 94) in Sweden. Our total sample is 261, and our overall response rate was 98%.

ask about the age at which respondents finished education, rather than the highest degree completed. Nevertheless, 64.6 % of Eurobarometer respondents report leaving school by age 19, whereas only 33.4% of our respondents had left education by age 19. Our respondents overall share the age profile of the European population, but the Swedish sample was somewhat older, and the Spanish sample somewhat younger, than the EU average.

[Table 3 here]

Policy priority-setting

The structure of the three national ECCs involved discussion about three broad policy areas: energy and the environment, family and social welfare, and the EU's global role and immigration. In our pre- and post-participation questionnaires we included a battery of questions aimed at each of these policy areas. We also added one question on the importance of open and democratic decision-making in the institutions of the European Union. For each policy, our survey asked, "How important are these issues for the future of Europe on a 1 to 5 scale, 1 meaning not at all important and 5 meaning extremely important ..."

... protection of the environment.

... energy independence and renewable energy sources.

... improving standards of social welfare in Europe.

... protection and opportunities for all families

... common foreign policy among member-states toward other countries.

... controlling the flow of immigration within the European Union and from outside the European Union's borders.

... the economic competitiveness of Europe in a globalized world.

... open and democratic decision-making in the institutions of the European Union.

The following table presents the results from the questionnaires for the sample of all three countries. It is noteworthy that every policy area increased in importance between the pre- and post-questionnaires, with the exception of environmental protection (rated the single most important anyway, with an average score of 4.7). Our questionnaire did not force respondents to make trade-offs among policy areas, and respondents did not make them on their own, as far as our data can reveal. Somewhat like the children of Lake Woebegone, every policy appears more important after deliberation than before it, in the overall sample.

[Table 4 here]

Below, we repeat the table using only paired mean comparisons (i.e., including only those individuals who answered both pre- and post-surveys). Sample sizes for these comparisons and p-values for the test of mean differences are displayed in the right-most column. There are statistically significant increases in every policy item, except for protection of opportunities for families.

[Table 5 here]

The table below breaks down the data by country of respondent. We ran two-tailed difference of means tests on the paired observations (i.e., where we have valid pre- and post-event observations for a given respondent). Those differences that are statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence level appear in bold in the table.

Two things stand out in this table. First, almost all the statistically significant shifts in opinion are positive. Respondents generally chose to elevate the policy importance of most areas while reducing the importance of none. The lone exception is the case of “protection of opportunities for all families” in Sweden, and Sweden is conventionally considered to have among the highest levels of social protection for families in the EU. The second thing we note is that comparatively larger shifts in opinion were observed in Spain, compared with the UK and Sweden.

[Table 6 here]

Our questionnaire paralleled the structure of the ECC deliberations in not asking participants to make trade-offs across policy areas. In retrospect, we regard this as a mistake. It would be more useful from a social scientific point of view to understand how, if at all, the ECCs changed the weighting of policy trade-offs in the minds of the participants. We observe also that this institutional feature of the ECCs does not give clear guidance to policy-makers or elites as to what they should prioritize.

Evaluation of Events and their Deliberative Quality

One rationale for using deliberative events like the ECC is that such events provide an opportunity for citizens to engage in politics in a participatory forum where they are treated as equals and can exchange reasoned views concerning the collective choices facing them. The first question social scientists and policy-makers should ask of any event is whether or not the event satisfied this basic criterion (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007). In our post-deliberation questionnaire, we asked participants several questions about their experiences in the deliberation using a 1-5 scale, where 1 meant ‘not at all’ and 5 meant ‘very much.’

Three questions bear directly on what the deliberative quality of the event. The first asked participants, “how much do you think your views were heard and understood by other participants in this event?”; a second asked “how insightful and intelligent were other participants in the event?”; and a third asked participants how much they agreed with the statement, “At this event, I gained information about issues affecting [my country] and Europe.” We included a fourth question which did not bear on the deliberative quality of the event per se, but rather asked participants whether they had changed their views as a result of the deliberations. The table below shows the distribution of responses to these four questions for the combined sample, and then for each country.

[Table 7 here]

We combined the three questions dealing with the quality of the deliberation—that views were heard and understood (treated as equals), that others were insightful and intelligent (mutual respect), and gained information (learning)—into an index of overall

integrity of the deliberation. We call this the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI).⁹ The average value of the DQI for the entire sample was 3.9, on a 5-point scale. The alpha reliability score for this additive index is a strong 0.63. Breaking down the scores by country, the average DQI for Spain, at 3.6, is roughly half a point lower—a substantively and statistically significant difference—than that for the UK (4.1) and Sweden (4.0). We have no *a priori* baseline against which to assess what constitutes a *high* level of participant satisfaction with the event. Based on the rather unscientific comparison metric of our own teaching evaluations, which are scored on a 1-5 scale, we consider the satisfaction level of the British and Swedish consultations as indicative of a high quality deliberative event. The participant evaluation for the Spanish consultation does not indicate to us a compromised event, but it is clearly less good than for the other two countries.¹⁰ If we take as a relevant benchmark the Likert scales in psychometric measurement, which use a similar 1-5 scale of agreement/disagreement, a break of 0.5 between the DQI in Sweden and the UK in comparison with Spain is considered substantively large.

[Table 8 here]

The data for Spain are paradoxical. On every measure of the DQI, as well as on question 14 (altered views as a result of conversations at event), the Spanish average was consistently the lowest of any of the three country samples. Thus, we would tend to say the quality of the deliberation was somewhat lower in Spain. However, as we saw in the previous

⁹ This term is similar to the Discourse Quality Index used by Jurg Steiner, André Bächtiger and their colleagues, but the content of the index is fundamentally different. Steiner and his colleagues code the content of legislative deliberations (Steiner et. al. 2005).

¹⁰ Comparable data are not available for Tomorrow's Europe. However, those data published on the TE website suggest a similarly high level of satisfaction with participants with that deliberation (http://www.tomorrowseurope.eu/IMG/pdf/TsE_Post_Deliberation_Evaluation_Questions-1.pdf).

section, Spanish respondents showed the *largest* average change in their views about the relative importance of different policy areas. Spanish ECC participants, who say they learned the least, changed policy positions the most, and in a consistently positive direction. We have no explanation for this outcome, but we find it intriguing.

Interestingly, responses to our question as to whether participants altered their own views as a result of their conversations *were not* statistically significant predictors of actual changes in opinion in any of the policy areas we asked about. However, responses to the question about altering views *were* positively and significantly correlated with change in positions about the importance of open and democratic decision-making in the EU. In other words, what participants learned at the ECCs did not change their minds about the importance of policy areas, but it did change their minds about the importance of European democracy.

[Table 9 here]

Forgetting country differences and examining the demographic breakdown of the sample as a whole, those in two groups had significantly more positive assessments as measured by the DQI than others. First, older people had a higher average DQI than did younger people. Second, we constructed a demographic category which we called “outsiders.” Outsiders are those unemployed and those who self-identify as manual laborers. Together, outsiders make up 12% of the total sample. We assembled this category because one of our specific concerns was with the ability of deliberative arrangements to overcome the mass-elite gap that characterizes views about the European Union (Hooghe and Marks

2007, Hooghe 2007). Those who are unemployed and who work in the manual professions are often most critical of the benefits the European Union brings to member countries, presumably because the greater openness of labor markets disadvantages those with the least human capital (Hug 2003).¹¹ Notwithstanding this general expectation, we find that being an outsider is leads to a systematically *higher* average DQI than not being an outsider.¹² Other things equal, in other words, the members of the outsider category were especially likely to evaluate the deliberation positively.

This finding is striking. One concern about deliberative events is that they will disproportionately attract those with higher socio-economic status, as do other forms of political participation. Our data confirm this is the case. Another concern is that those with high SES will dominate the proceedings, by virtue of their greater familiarity with either the policies discussed or because of a greater practical fluency in the habits of deliberative argument. We do not have data on a pattern of elite domination. However, our priors are that outsiders would not be likely to rate the deliberation highly if their views were not listened to or taken into account. That the outsiders in our sample did in fact have a high average DQI suggests that the deliberative process itself was not obviously dominated by the elites who are often said to shape the course of EU politics. Advocates of participatory decision-making in the EU are likely to find this view encouraging, though the question of elite domination requires more research in the EU context (cf. Andersen and Hansen 2007).

¹¹ Our data on educational categories, which follow those of Eurobarometer, are not able to distinguish clearly between levels of education, because they focus instead on age at which people left the educational system.

¹² The mean DQI for outsiders is 4.22 and for non-outsiders is 3.81, a difference that is significant at a p-value of 0.002.

Deliberation and Europhilia

Our results show two striking findings about Europhilia (table 10). First, in all three countries, those who agreed to participate in the ECC events were significantly more likely than their compatriots to say their country's membership in the EU was a good thing. The average percentage of people answering that membership in the EU was good for their country was 29 points higher in the UK, 22 points higher in Spain, and 7.5 points higher in Sweden, than it was for respondents from those countries in the Eurobarometer. Second, in the UK and Sweden, participants became *even more* positively oriented toward the EU in their post-event evaluations. The British participants increased by 13 percentage points, and the Swedish by 7.5 percentage points. The Spanish participants were essentially unchanged in their degree of Europhilia, but their very high level of pro-Europe feeling left them with comparatively little margin to increase in the post-event questionnaire.

[Table 10 here]

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which procedures for ensuring a representative population were adhered to across the different national deliberations. In the agenda-setting event for the ECCs, there were clearly problems of selection bias in the audience chosen. This is a general problem for deliberative events, which have great difficulty attracting a perfectly representative sampling of the population to participate in weekend-long deliberative events. The deliberative polls conducted by James Fishkin devote substantial energy to ensuring a representative sample, and among deliberative events they probably constitute the gold standard in this respect. Yet we have discussed some important

shortcomings in the representativeness of the Tomorrow's Europe deliberative poll, and Luskin et al. (2008: 3) report that the participants in TE were less Euro-skeptic than non-participants to a small but statistically significant degree.¹³ Given that even the most rigorous selection protocols still generate this result, it would appear that our finding is likely to be generalizable to deliberative events that deal with the EU: they attract a disproportionately Europhile set of participants, compared with the attitudes in the general population.

We do not have access to the Tomorrow's Europe data, but even the data presented on the website summarizing the event demonstrate that the same pro-Europe shift of opinion occurred in the course of that deliberation. The Tomorrow's Europe survey asks a slightly different, though comparable, question to ours and Eurobarometer's in their pre- and post-event surveys, with 0 representing those who think European membership is an extremely bad thing for their country and 10 representing those who think European membership is an extremely good thing for their country. As shown in the table below, the respondents viewing European membership as a good thing for their country, on balance, shifted upward by about 11 points, a statistically significant increase.¹⁴

[Table 11 here]

Tomorrow's Europe also asked about the appropriate level of decision-making in ten different policy-areas. The format of the question was standard across all ten areas: "On a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means that the individual member-states make all the decisions, 10 means that the EU makes all the decisions and 5 is exactly in the middle, how much of the decision-making in *policy area x* should be made by the individual member-states versus the

¹³ To determine degree of Euro-skepticism, Luskin et al. used a battery of ten questions asking participants the appropriate levels of decision-making in a variety of policy-areas (member-state competence or EU competence).

¹⁴ The level of "statistical significance" is not specified in the Tomorrow's Europe report. We presume it refers to the 0.10 significance level.

EU, or do you have any opinion about that?” On most of the policies the shift in favor of European sovereignty was positive, and the shift was statistically significant in three of those policy areas: foreign aid, energy supply, and diplomatic relations.

[Table 12 here]

The fact that we find shifts toward greater Europhilia in both the ECCs and in Tomorrow’s Europe suggests that the causes lie in some variable common to both types of events. One hypothesis is that mere *contact* with citizens from different European nations and societies in the hospitable context of an organized public deliberation creates a warm glow toward European institutions. A second plausible mechanism might be *consideration*. Devoting cognitive attention to European issues and the views of Europeans from other countries might dispose participants toward more Euro-friendly attitudes. Since the ECCs consisted primarily of national deliberations, these mechanisms seem unlikely, though we do not have data to test them directly.

A third possible mechanism is *polarization*. We do observe that the shift in views took place within three deliberative groups — the one in the UK, the one in Sweden, and the TE event in Brussels — in which Europhiles were overrepresented, given the overall population of Europe. This shift is consistent with the phenomenon of group polarization (Brown 1998). The fundamental dynamic of a group polarization — that deliberation magnifies the leanings of the individual members of the group — appears to have been somewhat present in the UK and Swedish ECC events. Again, we stress that we cannot know from our evidence what the mechanisms of group polarization toward greater Europhilia were in these ECCs. These shifts appear to have taken place massively in the UK, which is the

only one of the three we observed directly, even though the UK session was moderated by team from the University of York with experience in meeting facilitation. In observing the sessions in the UK, we noticed that this experienced team made sure that all participants had their say, that nobody dominated the discussion, and encouraged quiet people to share their views. The facilitators in York appeared to us very skilled and aware of group dynamics, which is perhaps one reason for the high DQI in the UK deliberation. Even with this group of experienced moderators, though, it seems possible that group polarization can take place. The issue of polarization is fundamental to deliberation generally, and it is particularly critical for the dimension of Europhilia and Euroskepticism. Future research might gain more traction on this question by examining the shifts in views among subgroups who, on average, begin from more positive and negative views about the European project.

This raises a fourth possibility, which is that the discussions were themselves *organized and facilitated* in ways that favored pro-European views. In both the TE and ECC events, participants were primed to consider issues facing Europe as a whole. Much less time and attention was devoted to the issues dividing nations or to criticisms of the European project. If these deliberations had employed different materials or focused on more Euroskeptical perspectives, the impact on Europhilia might have been quite different.

Neither the differences between the two deliberations nor our survey instruments allow us to differentiate between these four mechanisms to explain the Europhilia that resulted from both the TE and ECC events. These remain open and important questions for future research.

Comparative Lessons and Limitations

The ECC and TE events brought together almost 2,000 individuals from across Europe to consider European policy questions. They were perhaps the first round in a series of experiments with forms of popular engagement which supporters hope will improve both the quality of European policy-making and the political legitimacy of the EU. These two experiences offer several encouraging results as demonstration projects, but they leave unanswered questions about scalability and impact.

It is clear that the general mechanism of organizing European mini-publics, while complicated and costly, is feasible. Reasonable numbers of citizens will participate. Furthermore, they seem to be able to intelligently discuss complex policy issues such as environmental policy, social policy, and foreign affairs with co-nationals as well as with those from other member-states. At the level of external perception, most observers and participants regarded the ECCs and TE as well-organized, respectful, and thoughtful innovations in European public engagement and consultation.

Beyond demonstrating feasibility, these projects exhibited several characteristics that may be general, and so apply to other instances of public deliberation in the future. As with other opportunities for political participation and most other mini-publics, those who are better educated and more professional are more likely to participate than those who lack these advantages. Distinctive to these two European mini-publics, those who are more favorably disposed toward European integration are more likely to participate than Euroskeptics. Rigorous random selection efforts, such as those employed by Tomorrow's Europe organizers, can mitigate these biases but did not eliminate them completely. In the future, those who organize mini-publics should be aware of these underlying tendencies and incorporate them into the design of their participant selection methods and deliberative

agendas. If not, the same defect of most national party systems in Europe — failing to respond to the public opinion cleavage that exists over European integration — will merely be replicated by new techniques for deliberation.

It is more difficult to glean generalizable lessons about the substantive impacts of deliberation on institutional and policy views. In the ECCs, the mere experience of discussing European issues often made those issues more important in the minds of participants. This result will not surprise cognitive psychologists. For a variety of reasons discussed in the prior section, participants also came to regard EU institutions and EU membership more favorably after these deliberations. The structured transnational discussion and reflection of these mini-publics, even without significant connection to the levers of decision-making and influence, seems to have a positive effect on the legitimacy with which the European project is regarded. Finally, participating in the ECC discussions made participants think that democratic norms were more important to EU decision-making processes than prior to deliberation.

Due to the design of ECC deliberations and the limitations of our survey instrument, unfortunately we learn little about the substantive priorities of citizens or the effect of public deliberation upon those priorities. Whereas many deliberative practitioners stress the importance of asking participants to clarify their values and consider painful trade-offs between alternative courses, participants in the ECCs considered important issues such as the environment, energy, immigration, and economic competitiveness *seriatim*, without having to settle on priorities or make trade-offs (cf. Yankelovich 1999). Given this design, it is unsurprising that many participants thought all of these issues were quite important.

These data cannot help us answer two important questions about the relationship between public deliberation and the legitimacy of EU decision-making. First, how closely are

the policy priorities of European citizens aligned with those of EU officials? Second, does deliberation narrow or widen this policy preference gap? Future mini-publics should be designed in ways that help to illuminate these questions. There are two important questions upon which the ECCs and the TE offer little insight. Future public deliberations should be designed in ways that address these two dimensions of public engagement in EU governance. The first of these issues concerns the link between public deliberation and governmental action (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007). One of the aims of the ECC was to help EU decision-makers understand the policy priorities and orientations of a deliberative European public. But citizens and European policy-makers already understand that all the issues discussed at the ECCs are important and merit serious attention. As an agenda-setting event, the discussions were not designed, nor would time have allowed, participants to develop specific recommendations to policy makers. Even if they had been eager to do so, policy-makers would have had a difficult time knowing how to properly translate the results of the ECC discussions into policy shifts at the EU level. ECC participants were skeptical that policy makers would respond to their views and decisions. Evidence thus far suggests that their skepticism was justified.

Organizers of future European mini-publics might consider questions of design that may increase the likelihood of policy effect. To begin, deliberations might be structured in ways that could in principle yield advice and recommendations. Second, the topics of public deliberation might be chosen to coincide with policy areas that are on the agenda of EU officials. Third, topics of public deliberation might be chosen to maximize the contribution of public deliberation: areas in which the “democratic deficit” is thought to be especially high because of great social distance between officials and citizens on that issue, because of interest group capture, or because of other factors that result in policies that are particularly unresponsive to public views and priorities.

What political scientists know about the prospects for deliberative democracy in Europe is dwarfed by what we do not know. These projects have demonstrated the feasibility of constructing European mini-publics. But they have not yet established whether such public engagement projects will amount only to political curiosities, or whether they could eventually contribute to the quality of EU policy-making and the legitimacy of EU institutions. The widespread observation of shortcomings in the democratic underpinnings of the European Union underscores the importance of further empirical research in this area.

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Tables

Table 1: Size of the National ECCs

| Country | Participants | Country | Participants |
|----------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Bulgaria | 65 | Netherlands | 31 |
| Czech Republic | 40 | Poland | 50 |
| Estonia | 60 | Portugal | 30 |
| Ireland | 60 | Austria | 29 |
| Slovenia | 45 | Cyprus | 30 |
| Belgium | 120 | Finland | 30 |
| Germany | 200 | Italy | 40 |
| Hungary | 30 | Lithuania | 40 |
| Latvia | 45 | Malta | 31 |
| Slovakia | 45 | Romania | 45 |
| Denmark | 28 | Spain | 92 |
| France | 49 | Sweden | 94 |
| Greece | 28 | UK | 81* |
| Luxembourg | 46 | | |

Source: <http://www.european-citizens-consultations.eu/9.0.html>. *Officially, 74 randomly selected participants took part in the UK deliberation. However, organizers at the University of York invited several (non-randomly selected) university students to take part in the ECC event, raising the total number of participants to 81.

Table 2: Participation in Tomorrow's Europe and the EU Population (%)

| | Participants | Non-Participants | Total Polled | EU Population |
|---------------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Austria | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.7 |
| Belgium | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.1 |
| Bulgaria | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.5 |
| Cyprus | 0.8 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 0.2 |
| Czech | 3.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.1 |
| Denmark | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.1 |
| Estonia | 0.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.3 |
| Germany | 13.0 | 10.4 | 10.7 | 16.6 |
| Greece | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.2 |
| Spain | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 9.0 |
| Finland | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.1 |
| France | 11.3 | 8.1 | 8.5 | 13.0 |
| Great Britain | 7.7 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 12.3 |
| Hungary | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.0 |
| Ireland | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 0.8 |
| Italy | 7.7 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 12.0 |
| Lithuania | 1.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.7 |
| Luxembourg | 0.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.1 |
| Latvia | 1.9 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.5 |
| Malta | 0.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.1 |
| Netherlands | 4.1 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.3 |
| Poland | 7.2 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 7.7 |

| | | | | |
|----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Portugal | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.1 |
| Romania | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.4 |
| Sweden | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.8 |
| Slovenia | 1.1 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 0.4 |
| Slovakia | 1.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 1.1 |

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics From the ECC Surveys

| | <i>U.K.</i> | <i>Spain</i> | <i>Sweden</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>EU-27</i> |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Male | 50% | 52.8% | 53.3% | 52.1% | 48.7% |
| Female | 50% | 47.2% | 46.7% | 47.9% | 51.3% |
| Age | | | | | |
| 15-24 | 18.8% | 21.7% | 8.9% | 16.4% | 16.8% |
| 25-39 | 28.8% | 31.5% | 21.2% | 27.1% | 28.7% |
| 40-54 | 27.5% | 29.4% | 33.3% | 30.2% | 27.7% |
| 55+ | 25.0% | 17.4% | 36.7% | 26.3% | 26.7% |
| Age of Last Education | | | | | |
| 15 or less | 8.8% | 10.9% | 4.5% | 8.1% | 24.8% |
| 16-19 | 30.0% | 17.4% | 29.2% | 25.3% | 39.8% |
| 20+ | 32.5% | 46.7% | 55.1% | 45.2% | 24.7% |

| | <i>U.K.</i> | <i>Spain</i> | <i>Sweden</i> | <i>Total</i> | <i>EU-27</i> |
|--------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| still studying | 28.8% | 25.0% | 11.2% | 21.5% | 9.9% |
| Occupation | | | | | |
| self-employed | 8.9% | 12.0% | 11.2% | 10.7% | 7.6% |
| manager | 7.6% | 0.0% | 10.1% | 5.8% | 10.8% |
| other white collar | 29.1% | 51.1% | 34.8% | 38.7% | 18.7% |
| manual worker | 7.6% | 1.1% | 13.5% | 7.3% | 13.3% |
| house person | 3.8% | 3.3% | 2.3% | 3.1% | 10.2% |
| unemployed | 10.1% | 7.3% | 2.3% | 5.0% | 5.8% |
| retired | 15.2% | 7.6% | 18.0% | 13.4% | 23.8% |
| student | 17.7% | 21.7% | 7.9% | 15.7% | 9.7% |
| N | 80 | 91 | 90 | 261 | |

Note: Our event surveys were modeled on the occupational categories collected by Eurobarometer. The comparable figures given in the final column for these categories are the weighted averages from Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) and refer to the EU-25 (N=24,618). The age and gender data are from Eurostat (2004) and refer to

the populations of the current EU-27 member-states. The age data lists percent of adult population (those above age 14).

Table 4: Policy Shifts, Pre-Event and Post-Event

| | <i>Pre (1-5)</i> | <i>Post (1-5)</i> |
|--|------------------|-------------------|
| Protection of Environment | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| Energy Independence and Renewable Energy | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| Improving Social Welfare | 4.2 | 4.4 |
| Protection of Opportunities for All Families | 4.3 | 4.4 |
| Common EU Foreign Policy | 3.6 | 3.8 |
| Controlling Immigration | 4.0 | 4.2 |
| Economic Competitiveness of Europe | 3.8 | 4.0 |
| Open and Democratic EU Decision-Making | 4.4 | 4.5 |

Note: Scores ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 means a policy area is “not at all important” and 5 means a policy area is “extremely important.”

Table 5: Policy Shifts, Pre-Event and Post-Event, using only Paired Mean Comparisons

| | <i>Pre (1-5)</i> | <i>Post (1-5)</i> | <i>p-value (n)</i> |
|--|------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Protection of Environment | 4.66 | 4.73 | 0.08 (221) |
| Energy Independence and Renewable Energy | 4.48 | 4.59 | 0.04 (220) |
| Improving Social Welfare | 4.19 | 4.40 | 0.0001 (221) |
| Protection of Opportunities for All Families | 4.38 | 4.41 | 0.39 (222) |
| Common EU Foreign Policy | 3.62 | 3.82 | 0.01 (219) |
| Controlling Immigration | 4.00 | 4.19 | 0.001 (218) |
| Economic Competitiveness of Europe | 3.85 | 3.98 | 0.05 (218) |
| Open and Democratic EU Decision-Making | 4.41 | 4.55 | 0.014 (211) |

Table 6: Policy Shifts by Country

| | <i>UK1</i> | <i>UK2</i> | <i>Spain1</i> | <i>Spain2</i> | <i>Swe1</i> | <i>Swe2</i> |
|--|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Protection of Environment | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.7 |
| Energy Independence and Renewable Energy | 4.6 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.6 |
| Improving Social Welfare | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Protection of Opportunities for All Families | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.3 |
| Common EU Foreign Policy | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| Controlling Immigration | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Economic Competitiveness of Europe | 4.0 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 3.9 |
| Open and Democratic EU Decision-Making | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 4.6 |

Table 7: Aspects of Deliberative Quality at the ECCs

| | <i>All</i> | <i>UK</i> | <i>Spain</i> | <i>Swe</i> |
|--|------------|-----------|--------------|------------|
| 12. Views heard and understood | 3.9 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 4.0 |
| 13. Others insightful and intelligent | 4.1 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 4.1 |
| 14. Altered own views as a result of conversations | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.3 |
| 15. Gained information and knowledge | 3.6 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 3.9 |

Note: Scores range from 1-5, where 1 means 'not at all' and 5 means 'very much.'

Table 8: Comparing Country Mean Scores on the Deliberative Quality Index

| | Spain / Sweden | UK / Sweden | UK / Spain |
|----------------------------|----------------|-------------|--------------|
| Deliberative quality index | 3.6 / 4.0 | 4.1 / 4.0 | 4.1 / 3.6 |
| Mean difference (p-value) | 0.39 (.0003) | 0.14 (0.21) | 0.52 (.0000) |

Table 9: Importance of open and democratic decision-making in the institutions of the EU, pre- and post-event

| | <i>UK1</i> | <i>UK2</i> | <i>Spain1</i> | <i>Spain2</i> | <i>Swe1</i> | <i>Swe2</i> | <i>All1</i> | <i>All2</i> |
|--|------------|------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Open and Democratic EU Decision-Making | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.41 | 4.55 |

Note: [Scores range from 1-5, where](#) 1 means 'not at all' and 5 means 'very much.' Differences significant at the .95 confidence level shown in bold. UK1 refers to means in the UK, pre-event; UK2 refers to means in the UK, post-event.

Table 10: Membership in the EU is Good for my Country (%)

| | <i>Pre</i> | <i>Post</i> | <i>Eurobarometer 69 (2008)</i> |
|----------------|------------|-------------|------------------------------------|
| United Kingdom | 59 | 72 | 30 |
| Spain | 87 | 86 | 65 |
| Sweden | 61.5 | 69 | 54 |

Note: Percent answering “good” in response to the question, “Generally speaking, do you think [your country’s] membership of the European Union is....” Possible responses are “good,” “bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “don’t know.”

Table 11: Tomorrow's Europe — Is EU Membership a Good Thing for your Country?

| | Before Deliberation | After Deliberation |
|----------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 to 4 | 9.4 | 2.8 |
| 6 to 10 | 79.0 | 89.9 |

Source:

http://www.tomorrowseurope.eu/IMG/pdf/TsE_All_Opinion_Changes_T1_T2_T3-b.pdf

Note : Scores between 0 and 4 are those who believe their country's membership of the EU is a good thing; scores between 6 and 10 are those who believe their country's membership of the EU is a bad thing. The exact text of the question is "Some people think that your country's membership in the EU is an extremely bad thing. Suppose these people are at one end of a 0-to-10 scale, at point 0. Other people think that your country's membership in the EU is an extremely good thing. Suppose these people are at the other end of the scale, at point 10. People who are exactly in the middle are at point 5, and of course other people have opinions at other points between 0 and 10. Where would you place your views on this scale, or do you have any opinion about that?"

Table 12: Tomorrow's Europe — Post Deliberation Shifts on Questions of Sovereignty

| | Post- Deliberation Δ in Pro-EU Sovereignty | Post-Deliberation Δ in Pro-Member-state Sovereignty |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Foreign Aid | +12.0 | -8.4 |
| Energy Supply | +6.9 | -6.6 |
| Diplomatic Relations | +6.9 | -8.3 |

Source: http://www.tomorrowseurope.eu/IMG/pdf/TsE_All_Opinion_Changes_T1_T2_T3-b.pdf

Note : Post-deliberation change in Pro-EU sovereignty refers to all the change between the pre-event and post-event surveys in the proportion of respondents who answered between 6 and 10 when asked, “On a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means that the individual member-states make all the decisions, 10 means that the EU makes all the decisions and 5 is exactly in the middle, how much of the decision-making in *policy area x* should be made by the individual member-states versus the EU, or do you have any opinion about that?” Post-deliberation change in Pro-member-state sovereignty refers to the change between the pre-event and post-event surveys in the proportion of respondents who answered between 0 and 4 on the same question.