Pepper D. Culpepper
Banklash: How Media Coverage of Bank Scandals Moves Mass Preferences on Financial Regulation. [with Jae-Hee Jung and Taeku Lee] American Journal of Political Science, 2023.
The Art of the Shitty Deal: Media Frames and Public Opinion on Financial Regulation in the United States. [with Taeku Lee] Socio-Economic Review, 2022.
Media Frames, Partisan Identification and the Australian Banking Scandal. [with Taeku Lee] Australian Journal of Political Science, 2021.
Quiet Politics in Tumultuous Times: Business Power, Populism, and Democracy. Politics & Society, March 2021 [part of a special issue on quiet politics and the power of business].
Computational Identification of Media Frames: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Opportunities. [with Tom Nicholls] Political Communication, 2020.
Are We All Amazon Primed? Consumers and the Politics of Platform Power. [with Kathleen Thelen] Comparative Political Studies 2019.
Culpepper's Banklash Project Awarded €2.5 million Advanced Research Grant from the European Research Council. April 2018.
What President Trump means. Post-Election Panel Discussion at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, November 16, 2016.
Structural Power and Contemporary Politics. Symposium on Structural Power at the Duck of Minerva, February 2016.
Capitalism, Institutions, and Power in the Study of Business. Forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, 2016.
Structural Power and Political Science in the Post-Crisis Era. Business and Politics, October 2015.
Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States. [with Raphael Reinke] Politics & Society, December 2014.
America's Bank Bailouts Worked. Blog post on the Monkey Cage, Washington Post, November 17, 2014.
The Political Economy of Unmediated Democracy: Italian Austerity under Mario Monti. West European Politics, November 2014.
Why Don't Governments Need Trade Unions Anymore? [with Aidan Regan]Socio-Economic Review, October 2014.
Quiet Politics and Business Power wins 2012 Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research.
Quiet Politics and Business Power
"Quiet Politics is a roaring affirmation of the intellectual power that is generated by combining impressive theoretical sophistication with enormous empirical depth and great political acumen. These days, our debates about the politics of capitalism are noisy and shallow. All serious students of political economy will benefit from some quiet hours chewing on and digesting the intellectual feast that this book offers."
Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell University
"‘Quiet politics’ points to a major problem of democracies, often overlooked by the focus of politicians and political scientists on salient political conflicts, partisan coalitions and public debate. It contributes to empirical democratic theory, redirecting attention to policy-making in non-salient but tremendously important arenas. In addition, Culpepper’s study builds empirical and theoretical bridges to the fields of business administration, to law and to comparative political economy more generally. Quiet Politics and Business Power is a major contribution to the study of political and economic institutions, processes and outcomes."
Citation for XVIIth Stein Rokkan Prize
"A remarkable book.... This is first-class qualitative social science, using an alternating process of deductive and inductive reasoning to tease out hypotheses and test them against case study evidence. Lucidly written and persuasively argued, Culpepper convincingly challenges a host of existing approaches to the study of corporate governance and business power, while making his core topic of corporate control of great interest to specialists and accessible to those more interested in his theory.
European Political Science
"Professor Culpepper's insightful analysis exposes a hidden dynamic that shapes takeover regulation in a diverse group of capitalist democracies: managers make the rules while politicians are not watching. Quiet Politics will change how readers think about the buying and selling of companies, and the process of regulating the market for corporate control."
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Columbia Law School